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Integration of Corporate Social Responsibility
Through International Voluntary Initiatives
TIM BAINES*
ABSTRACT
Many multinational companies and financial institutions have adopted corporate
social responsibility programs, often relying on the implementation of international
voluntary initiatives. This article describes two such mechanisms. The first, the Equa-
tor Principles, provides guidance to financial institutions involved in project finance.
The second, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, helps governments to encourage businesses to be
socially and environmentally responsible. This article suggests means by which volun-
tary initiatives can be implemented to benefit both the wider community and compa-
nies themselves. It also suggests ways of overcoming shortcomings resulting from the
lack of access to formal legal sanctions when implementing voluntary initiatives.
INTRODUCTION
Many multinational enterprises (MNEs) and international financial institu-
tions have formally adopted corporate social responsibility' (CSR) programs. The
time and effort consumed by CSR is illustrated by a number of factors, including
the long list of international events that form the annual CSR calendar, indices
such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, FTSE4Good, and the array of vol-
* L.L.B., London School of Economics and Political Science. Associate, Dewey & LeBeouf
LLP, London, U.K.
1. This article deliberately sidesteps the debate over what CSR is and how it should be defined.
However, for those entirely unfamiliar with the concept, a useful working definition has been
provided by the European Commission. The Commission defines CSR as "[a] concept whereby
companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment." Commis-
sion Green Paper on Employment and Social Affairs, Promoting a European Frameworkfor Corporate
Responsibility, at 5, COM (2001) 366 final (July 2001).
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untary initiatives that have been adopted by MNEs keen to embed CSR and to
demonstrate their corporate credentials.
Despite this trend, MNEs continue to act in ways that do not accord with the
spirit of good CSR.2 This is not surprising for a number of reasons. First, there is
legal and academic uncertainty about whether or not corporations have any social
"responsibility" at all.3 Second, even assuming that corporations should act in a
socially responsible manner, it has been impossible to identify a definitive concept
of CSR. Third, MNEs continue to be protected by a lack of legal regulation or
enforcement in some jurisdictions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, MNEs,
particularly Anglo-American MNEs, have wholeheartedly accepted the economic
theory underpinned by the notion that "the business of business is business."4
As a result, while there has been increasing scrutiny of MNEs' global social
and environmental impacts, particularly in the area of human rights, and imple-
mentation of international, all-encompassing CSR reporting, the implementation
of established CSR programs by MNEs remains a relatively new phenomenon.
Perhaps the reason for this is that MNEs have been slow to understand their abil-
ity to use CSR in a manner that enhances corporate opportunities and competi-
tiveness. They have not recognized that CSR has the potential to improve a
company's social and environmental impacts and limit reputational damage,
while at the same time improving its profitability.
This article does not seek to define the concept of CSR or to determine whether
or not the pursuit of CSR by MNEs is, in reality, beneficial (either for MNEs them-
selves or for their stakeholders). CSR is now so much a part of the corporate land-
scape that it has become as important to look at how MNEs implement CSR strategy
as it is to question their motives. This article therefore focuses on one of the pre-
dominant aspects of CSR implementation by MNEs-the voluntary adoption of
international CSR initiatives. Such initiatives are not necessarily categorized as CSR
2. Examples of such behavior are tracked by an array of non-governmental organizations. See,
e.g., Banktrack, Private Finance: A Public Interest, http://www.banktrack.org (last visited Oct. 6,
2008); Ethical Corporation Institute, http://www.ethicalcorporationinstitute.com/ (last visited
Oct. 6,2008).
3. "What does it mean to say that 'business' has responsibilities? Only people can have respon-
sibilities. A corporation is an artificial person, and in this sense, may have artificial responsibilities,
but 'business' as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague sense." Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970,
at 33.
4. This theory, associated with Milton Friedman, states that companies should focus on return-
ing shareholder value.
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performance or implementation initiatives and indicators (though some of them
are),5 but all play a prominent role in many MNEs' CSR strategies.
This article will focus on the Equator Principles (EPs)6 and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises (the Guidelines).7 After reviewing each initiative's purposes,
tenets, and influence on MNEs, this article will use the criteria outlined by Har-
vard Business School Professors Michael Porter and Mark Kramer8 to test the
extent to which these initiatives enable organizations to embed CSR into their
daily operations and to fully capitalize on the benefits that CSR offers. This article
will then address the criticism that the voluntary nature and the lack of formal
legal sanction of voluntary CSR initiatives is an Achilles heel that renders these
initiatives inherently unfit for their purpose. Finally, this article will suggest how
such initiatives could be altered in order to improve the implementation of CSR
by MNEs and financial institutions.
I. Two KEY INITIATIVES
A. The Equator Principles
1. What They Are
The EPs provide an extremely important example of a voluntary CSR initia-
tive adopted by many leading financial institutions? The adoption of the EPs rep-
resents one of the first instances in which competing financial institutions have
come together to agree upon a detailed framework for the implementation of im-
provements in their social and environmental practices.
The EPs are voluntary social and environmental guidelines to which over
5. One example of this is voluntary CSR reporting in accordance with the Global Reporting
Initiative's recommendations. See Global Reporting Initiative, G3 Online, http://www.globalr
eporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
6. The Equator Principles (July 2006), http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/
Equator Principles.pdf [hereinafter Equator Principles or EPs].
7. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], The OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
8. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibly, HARv. Bus. REv., Dec. 2006, at 78.
9. A more detailed description of how the EPs work is set out in Paul Q. Watchman et al., EP
2: The Revised Equator Principles: Why Hard-nosed Bankers are Embracing Soft Law Principles, LAW
& FIN. MKTS. REV., Mar. 2007, at 85.
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sixty banks and financial institutions (together, the Equator Principles Financial
Institutions, or EPFIs) have agreed to be bound. They do not contain a detailed
set of enforceable legal norms, but rather a general framework of ten broad prin-
ciples underpinned by International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance
Standards" and the application of local and national law."
The EPs comprise two sets of principles. The first set, EPI, was conceived
with the help of the IFC in 2002 and was launched in 2003. The second revised
set, EP2, has been open for adoption by EPFIs since July 2006.12 Under the EPs,
EPFIs agree not to provide loans to a project unless sponsors can demonstrate that
the project will be constructed and operated in accordance with sound social and
environmental management practices.
2. How They Work
The EPs require projects to be categorized as A, B, or C projects in accordance
with the degree of risk the project presents to society or the environment. 3 The fol-
lowing table describes the categories by risk:
TABLE I: PROJECT CHARACTERIZATION 4
Category A: High Risk Projects with potential significant adverse social or environ-
mental impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or unprecedented.
Category B: Medium Risk Projects with potentially limited adverse social and
environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site specific, largely reversible,
and readily addressed through mitigation measures.
Category C: Low/No Risk Projects with minimal or no social or environmental
impacts.
Category A and Category C projects are relatively easy for EPFIs to identify
as they will be the highest- and lowest-risk projects, respectively. If a project is
categorized as a Category B project, the applicable requirements differ depending
10. International Finance Corporation, Performance Standards on Social and Environmental
Sustainability (Apr. 30, 2006), http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
polPerformanceStandards200 6_full/$ FILE/I FC + Performance+ Standards.pdf.
11. Equator Principles, supra note 6, princ. 3.
12. Equator Principles, supra note 6.
13. Id. exhibit II.
14. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, BANKING ON RESPONSIBILITY 30-32 (2005).
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upon whether the project is located in a non-OECD country or a non-High-In-
come OECD country, as defined by the World Bank Development Indicators. I"
Regardless of this distinction, it may be considered appropriate to subject certain
projects to a certain requirement. Those requirements are described as follows:
TABLE 2: EPFI REQUIREMENTS FOR CATEGORY A
AND CATEGORY B PROJECTS 6
Requirement Category A Category B
Carry out Environmental and Social Impact All Category A All Category B
Assessment
Implement Social and Environmental Action All Category A Category B*
Plan and Management System
Carry out Public Consultation All Category A Category B*#
Instigate Grievance Procedures All Category A Category B*#
Subject project to Independent Expert Review All Category A Category B#
Subject project to Independent Monitoring All Category A Category B#
Annual Reporting Obligations All Category A All Category B
Loan Covenants: All Category A Category B*
" Materially comply with applicable social and
environmental laws, regulations, and
permits
" Materially comply with the Action Plan
Compliance and Enforcement mechanism:
* Compliance with Decommissioning Plan
KEY
*Non-OCED counries and Non-High-Income OCED countries
#When appropriate to subject the project to requirement
Since the adoption of EPI, EPFIs have been required to review loan docu-
mentation in light of the wider environmental (and in the case of EP2, social) as-
sessment, monitoring, and enforcement obligations to which they have agreed to
be bound. EP2 has introduced borrower covenants that must be incorporated into
loan documentation. These covenants are set out in the table above.
15. Equator Principles, supra note 6, princs. 3-6; WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICA-
TORS 2008 (2008).
16. See Equator Principles, supra note 6, princs. 3-6.
17. Id. princ. 8.
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The EPs provide no ombudsman or alternative means of redress for their
breach, relying primarily on the goodwill of the EPFI to implement them prop-
erly. However, the EPs ae now subject to a number of criteria which provide for a
certain degree of EPFI accountability. These are discussed further below.
B. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
1. What They Are
The Guidelines were first drafted in 1976 and were most recently revised in
June 2000. They are recommendations addressed to MNEs that aim to ensure
that the MNE operations are in harmony with government policies.
The Guidelines provide guidance for MNEs in all major areas of business
ethics, including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environ-
mental concerns, information disclosure, corruption, consumer interests, science
and technology, competition, and taxation. They are the only multilaterally en-
dorsed and comprehensive code that governments have committed to promoting
with respect to MNEs."8
The Guidelines express the shared values of the countries that house the most
MNEs and are the sources of most of the world's direct investment flows. They
have now been signed by the thirty OECD member countries and the following
ten non-member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Israel, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia. 9
2. How They Work
The governments adhering to the Guidelines agree to promote their implemen-
tation by enterprises operating in the governments' territories. The OECD Decision
and its Procedural Guidance provide the institutional structure for promoting the
implementation of the Guidelines. There are four main elements to the implementa-
tion of the Guidelines: the National Contact Points (NCPs); the OECD Investment
Committee; the Advisory Committees of Business and Labor Federations; and non-
governmental organizations represented by OECD Watch. The NCPs offer a forum
for discussion and to assist the business community, employee organizations, and
18. OECD, The OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises:
Promoting Responsible Government and Responsible Business (2000), www.oecd.org/document/49/
0,3343,en_2649_34487_2068145_1_I_11,00.html.
19. OECD, Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108-33844
430 1 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Oct. 6,2008).
228
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other parties concerned with implementation of the Guidelines. The NCPs meet an-
nually to share their experiences and to report to the Investment Committee.
2°
When the Guidelines were revised in 2000, a new procedure was added that
allowed complaints to be brought against MNEs that are not following the Guide-
lines. This is discussed further in Subpart C.
C. Voluntary Initiatives Compared
Despite the differences between the EPs and the Guidelines in their legal
nature and implementation, there are a number of similarities that are interesting
to highlight."
1. Scope ofApplication
Both the EPs and the Guidelines possess international scope and application.
However, while the EPs are applicable only to financial institutions that engage in
project finance,22 the Guidelines have substantially broader application. The Guide-
lines are not limited to one particular sector (project finance) or type of MNE (fi-
nancial institutions). This is perhaps the reason that the Guidelines are considerably
less prescriptive than the EPs as to the precise manner in which their requirements
must be implemented. It would be very difficult to create a detailed framework like
the EPs that would be applicable to every area of an MNE's activities.
2. Voluntary Nature
Both the EPs and the Guidelines are voluntary initiatives. The Guidelines
seek to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between the MNEs and the
societies in which they operate. The Guidelines also aim to help improve the cli-
mate for foreign investment and enhance the contribution to sustainable develop-
20. OECD, Implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, http://www
.oecd.org/document/43/0,3343,en_2649_34889_2074731_111-l,00.html (last visited Oct. 6,2008).
21. These are explored further in OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
and the Equator Principles-Similarities, Differences and Synergies, OECD Doc. DAF/INV/
NCP(2007)3, available at http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/corporate socialliability/eps-
and-gls.pdf.
22. Project finance is based upon a structure where project debt and equity are used to calculate
financing. It is commonly associated with, for example, the development of mining, pipeline, and
other infrastructure projects. A syndicate of banks usually provides loans to the project, which are
secured by the project itself and repaid from the project's cash flows.
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ment made by MNEs. Although not expressly stated in the EPs, the same
considerations apply to the EPFIs with respect to their project finance activities.
3. Public/Private Nature
The EPs and the Guidelines are similar instruments in their legal nature.
Neither the EPs nor the Guidelines contain a detailed set of enforceable legal
norms, but rather a general, voluntary framework of principles and standards.
However, while the EPs are purely private, endorsed only by EPFIs, the Guide-
lines are signed by national governments and contain recommendations to MNEs
operating in their territories.
4. Internal Procedures and Accountability
Both the EPs and the Guidelines provide similar advantages for MNEs and
EPFIs in terms of organization and management, internal and external account-
ability, and harmonization of practices with competitors. They provide a frame-
work within which entities can consider the ways in which they interact with their
stakeholders. This serves as a checklist against which they can review and imple-
ment their practices. The fact that the EPs and Guidelines provide a common
framework applicable to other EPFIs or MNEs means that they can compare their
activities with those of their peers. It also makes organizations more susceptible to
comparison by stakeholders, providing stakeholders with a uniform benchmark
against which to judge the organization, thereby instilling accountability.
5. Social and Environmental Standards
In comparison with the EPs, the environment chapter of the Guidelines is
narrower in that it provides only for an environmental impact assessment rather
than a social and environmental impact assessment. However, the Guidelines do
highlight the need to address the foreseeable environmental, health and safety
impacts associated with the processes and goods and services in the business' deci-
sion making. The Guidelines suggest a framework for the consideration of an
organization's general environmental impacts. 3
The Guidelines are particularly comprehensive with respect to environmen-
tal management systems (EMS). They provide that EMS should include the col-
lection and evaluation of information regarding the environmental, health and
safety impacts of enterprises; the establishment of quantifiable objectives and tar-
gets for improved environmental performance; and the regular monitoring of
23. OECD Guidelines, supra note 7, at 22-24.
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progress in reaching those objectives. This is a potentially high benchmark, but
EMS does provide substantial room for varying levels of implementation.
Unlike the EPs, which are based on the IFC's Safeguard Principles, the EMS
required by the Guidelines are not based on uniform standards and are not bench-
marked. There are several different models of EMS: externally certified EMS
(like ISO 14001); European Union's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS); and performance-based EMS and sector-specific EMS (for example,
EMS for the chemical and the financial sectors).
6. Sanction for Breach
The EPs provide little external interference if they are breached by EPFIs. In
contrast, pursuant to the Guidelines, the NCPs have a duty to manage complaints
relating to MNEs registered within or operating from their countries. NCPs ac-
complish this by facilitating dialogue and mediation between the two parties. If
they determine that the company has breached the Guidelines, the NCPs issue a
statement making recommendations to the company on how it could bring its fu-
ture practices in line with the Guidelines. Further, the Guidelines provide interested
parties the right to submit complaints concerning the activities of companies.24
II. EVALUATING VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES AGAINST
THE PORTER-KRAMER TENETS
A. The Tenets
Porter and Kramer suggest how businesses can successfully integrate busi-
ness and social responsibility. The key tenets of their recommended strategy re-
quire companies:
(a) to identify the points of intersection between a company and a society;
(b) to choose which social issues to address;
(c) to create a corporate social agenda;
(d) to integrate inside-out and outside-in practices; and
(e) to construct a social dimension to the value proposition.25
24. "According to the OECD, by June 2005, over 100 complaints had been filed by NGOs and
trade unions since the Guidelines were revised." OECD WATCH, FIVE YEARS ON: A REVIEW OF THE
OECD GUIDELINES AND NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS 5 (2005).
25. Porter & Kramer, supra note 8, at 84-90.
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Their central message 6 is that if "corporations were to analyze their pros-
pects for social responsibility using the same frameworks that guide their core
business choices, they would discover that CSR can be much more than a cost, a
constraint, or a charitable deed-it can be a source of opportunity, innovation,
and competitive advantage."27
Voluntary initiatives could play an important role in allowing MNEs and
EPFIs to implement Porter and Kramer's vision, provided that they are struc-
tured in an appropriate manner. Nonetheless, the implementation of the model
set out by Porter and Kramer is not without its challenges, and implementing
such a cultural shift will be too difficult for many organizations.
B. Identification of the Points of Intersection Between a Company and a Society
This section of the article evaluates the EPs and Guidelines against the crite-
ria discussed above to determine the extent to which they contribute to MNEs'
ability to fulfill Porter and Kramer's ambition for CSR initiatives (that is, to be a
source of opportunity, innovation, and competitive advantage).
Porter and Kramer suggest that to optimize the implementation of CSR ini-
tiatives, companies must begin by identifying the points of intersection between
the company and society. They differentiate between "inside-out" and "outside-
in" linkages.2" The former are the impositions that a company makes through its
operations in the normal course of business; the latter are external social condi-
tions that influence companies.
EPFIs, which are typically large financial institutions, have significant inside-
out linkages. These include their direct energy and water use, the services that
they provide to the public, and their overall impact on the global economy. Finan-
cial institutions that take the time to implement in accordance with the EPs, par-
ticularly the founding members of the EP, are likely to be among the banks that
best identify their inside-out linkages. Many EPFIs issue extremely comprehen-
sive CSR reports that illustrate many or all of these inside-out impacts. EPFIs
26. Herman B. Leonard & W. Kasturi Rangan, Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy and
Boards of Directors, BOARDROOM BRIEFING, Dec. 2006, at 12, available at http://www.directorsan
dboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/December2OO6/WinterO6BB.pdf.
27. Porter & Kramer, supra note 8, at 80.
28. Id. at 84.
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benchmark and report on their social and environmental impacts on a regular
basis.29 The same is true of many MNEs. °
However, as Porter and Kramer state, in relation to inside-out linkages, "[w]hile
companies are increasingly aware of the social impact of their activities (such as hir-
ing practices, emissions, and waste disposal), these impacts can be more subtle and
variable than many managers realize. For one, they depend on location."' This is
particularly true in the case of project finance, where the extent of the bank's respon-
sibilities for funding projects that have massive social and environmental impacts is
difficult to delineate. When does a bank's responsibility for the environmental and
social issues cease in a situation where, without the finance provided by that bank, a
project would not proceed?
While the EPs apply only to a relatively small part of most EPFIs' activities (they
apply only to project finance lending and advisory activities and not, for example, to
its trading or retail banking activities), they nonetheless require a very detailed analy-
sis by EPFIs of the intersection between the bank's activities and the society in which
it operates. This is illustrated not only by the detailed social and environmental im-
pact assessments that EPFIs require borrowers to carry out but also by the implemen-
tation of action plans, consultation, and grievance procedures.32 The same is true of
MNEs that are conducting their affairs in accordance with the Guidelines.33
"Outside-in" linkages consist of the ability to recruit high quality personnel;
the rules relating to competition, bribery, and corruption; the size and sophistica-
tion of local demand; and the local availability of supporting industries. Again,
these are often delineated in EPFIs' and MNEs' CSR reports, which usually iden-
tify a broad range of stakeholders and regulations by which the EPFI or MNE is
bound. In the areas of project finance, there are a number of specific linkages that
have caused concern in the past. For example, there are reputational concerns
when dealing with the impact that projects have on affected communities, as well
as the social and environmental consequences of funding certain projects.
Of course, EPFIs could be criticized for not extending the scope of the EPs
29. See Equator Principles, Become an Adopting Institution, http://www.equator-principles
.com/join.shtml (last visited Dec. 14, 2008) (providing CSR reports for all EPFIs).
30. KPMG recently indicated that 80% of the world's largest companies now report on CSR.
KMPG INT'L, KMPG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008, at
13 (2008), available at http://www.kpmg.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/International-corporate
-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf.
31. Porter & Kramer, supra note 8, at 84.
32. See supra Table 1.
33. See supra Part l.B.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:1
beyond project finance and hence not requiring detailed analyses of EPFIs' points
of intersection. However, project finance is one of the few areas of an EPFI's ac-
tivities where the EPFI is likely to have direct contractual control as a lender over
the borrower's activities. In the case of day-to-day corporate lending, the bank
may have very little involvement in the borrower's activities. In project finance,
lenders have the opportunity to scrutinize the borrower's intended activities to a
much greater degree. In recognition of the myriad significant environmental and
social issues at stake, EPFIs have identified project finance as an important area
where their activities most closely intersect with society. It appears, therefore, that
the EPs have been successful, to a degree, in supporting EPFIs in the identifica-
tion of linkages between EPFIs and society.
The Guidelines address the foreseeable environmental, health and safety im-
pacts associated with the MNE's processes and goods and services. Unlike the
EPs, they do not provide for an action plan or management system. They are less
specific in their application than the EPs (relating, as they do, to the whole of the
organization's operations). While the EPs impose no requirement on the EPFIs
to consider their own behavior (applying only to assessment of the proposed proj-
ect by borrowers), the Guidelines encourage MNEs to consider their own envi-
ronmental impacts by suggesting a framework for assessing the general
environmental impacts of an organization.34
The fact that the EPs set out a detailed list of criteria to be considered by
EPFIs when engaging in project finance activities35 means that EPFIs are forced
to look beyond their own activities and consider the broader social and environ-
mental impacts of the projects they are funding. For example, the EPs require
banks, through their borrowers, to take into consideration project-affected com-
munities. However, in contrast to the Guidelines, the EPs are largely silent on the
bank's own internal organization, save to the extent that EPFIs will implicitly be
required to maintain the implementation of the EPs and provide mechanisms,
such as staff training programs, for their implementation.
C. Choosing Which Social Issues to Address
The EPs are only one element in a broad spectrum of many EPFIs' CSR
agendas. However, in the case of an EPFI with more limited resources and in ju-
34. OECD Guidelines, supra note 7, at 22-24.
35. These activities are backed up by the IFC Safeguard Standards and further sector-specific
guidance.
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risdictions where CSR is less developed, the EPs are still likely to play a significant
part in their CSR strategies. The Guidelines underlie a broader spectrum of
MNE's activities.
In choosing which social issues to address, Porter and Kramer suggest that com-
panies should differentiate between the following:
* "generic social issues" (those which may be important to society but are nei-
ther significantly affected by the company's operations nor influence the com-
pany's long-term competitiveness);
* "value chain social impacts" (those that are significantly affected by the com-
pany's activities in the ordinary course of business); and
• "social dimensions of competitive context" (those facts that significantly affect
the underlying drivers of competitiveness where the company operates).36
Further, "[t]he essential test that should guide CSR is not whether a cause is
worthy but whether it presents an opportunity to create shared value-that is, a
meaningful benefit for society that is also a value to the business.""
The EPs act at all three of the levels identified above. The adoption of the
EPs represents a response to a generic social issue, which requires that financial
institutions play an important role in shaping the world's economy. Their policies
can also have significant environmental and social impacts. Further, dealing ef-
fectively with the social and environmental aspects of a project in order to circum-
vent regulatory issues, court cases, and delays in project implementation constitute
significant value chain social impacts.
Implementation of the EPs represents a means of addressing one of the areas
in which EPFIs have the greatest, albeit indirect, social and environmental im-
pact. There is a link between the implementation of the EPs and value for the
EPFIs. For instance, the extent to which EPFIs are seen as attractive lenders or
partners in a loan syndicate because of their implementation of the EPs, or the
extent to which only non-EPFIs are able to finance projects that the EPs would
not allow an EPFI to finance, indicates that the EPs have the ability to raise issues
that constitute social dimensions of a competitive context.
Whereas the EPs currently address only one part of EPFIs' CSR agendas, the
Guidelines are sufficiently generic for them to be able to set out a framework for the
whole range of a company's behavior. Superficially, this is advantageous as it means
that MNEs are provided with a broader framework for the implementation of their
36. Porter & Kramer, supra note 8, at 85.
37. Id. at 84.
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CSR agendas. However, Porter and Kramer highlight the importance of an MNE's
choice of which social issues to address, and the imperative of identifying "social
dimensions of competitive context." These are the facts that significantly affect the
underlying drivers of competitiveness in places where the company operates. While
the sectoral approach of the EPs illustrates that EPFIs have concentrated on an area
of their business most exposed to risks associated with poor environmental and so-
cial performance, the Guidelines are insufficiently specific to guide MNEs in their
identification of particular social issues. Nevertheless, the suggestion that MNEs
implement EMS is likely to draw their attention to those areas of greatest environ-
mental impact. The failure of the Guidelines to provide for social assessment is a
significant omission in this respect.
D. Creating a Corporate Social Agenda
Porter and Kramer differentiate between "responsible" and "strategic" CSR,
stating that it is through strategic CSR that the company will make the most sig-
nificant social impact and will reap the greatest business benefits. The fact that an
EPFI has adopted the EPs should be seen as an important part of an EPFI's social
agenda. However, the EPs were never intended to be an implementing frame-
work beyond project finance. Therefore, it is not surprising that the EPs have little
to offer with respect to creating an overall corporate social agenda.
Strategic CSR involves "both inside-out and outside-in dimensions working in
tandem."'38 Credit Agricole (now Calyon), which offers specialist financial products
related to the environment, such as financing improvements for energy-efficient
home products, is one example of this type of strategic CSR. It could be argued that
the EPs constitute a new kind of strategic financial product in the project finance
market, in which case this would be an example of the EPs making a small step into
the crucial zone of "strategic CSR." It also has been argued that the EPs should be
extended to cover forms of financing other than project finance.39 For example, the
EPFIs could apply EP-like criteria on a sectoral basis, such as all lending in the for-
estry sector, regardless of whether or not the lending is project finance.4 ° Although
the idea has been rejected by some leading bankers, if the EPs were extended more
broadly, financial institutions may further integrate social and environmental con-
cerns and thus participate in a more inclusive type of "strategic CSR." The imple-
38. Id. at 88.
39. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER,supra note 14, at 71.
40. Id.
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mentation of a sector-specific approach that sets out environmental and social criteria
for different kinds of financial activities is a viable alternative.
The generality of the Guidelines, in contrast with the EPs, successfully pro-
vides for the creation of a broader corporate social agenda. This is because the
Guidelines require decision-making processes to address the business' foreseeable
environmental, health and safety impacts. While it is possible to adhere to this
criterion without creating a corporate social agenda, the thrust of the Guidelines
requires these issues to be considered holistically, both up and down the supply
chain. This holistic approach is helpful in creating a corporate social agenda.
The Guidelines, however, provide no impetus for the creation of a "strategic"
CSR agenda. They do not require MNEs to adopt CSR strategies that take into
account the positive rewards that can be reaped where inside-out and outside-in
dimensions work in tandem. The EPs promote a relatively more strategic ap-
proach to CSR.
E. Integrating Inside-out and Outside-in Practices
Linked to Porter and Kramer's idea that CSR should be strategic is the view
that "inside-out" and "outside-in" practices should be integrated. An example of
such integration is Marriott Hotels working with community groups to provide
training to chronically unemployed job candidates, many of whom subsequently
take jobs with Marriott." The EPs attempt to improve EPFIs' reputations, and
possibly their bottom lines, through the application of high standards to project
finance transactions. However, in order to fully integrate inside-out and outside-
in linkages, the EPs have to go further. It is difficult to see how this could be done
in the context of project finance. One possibility is that, where appropriate, EPFIs
could integrate the development of EP projects with microfinance initiatives into
communities affected by the projects. However, it is likely that the creation of
such virtuous circles would be seen as artificial and that the EPs would not be
considered the appropriate forum for implementing such schemes.
The apparent weakness in the Guidelines is the lack of specificity in the identi-
fying inside-out and outside-in practices beyond the most generic factors in the de-
cision-making process. The Guidelines fail the Porter and Kramer criterion of
integrating such practices. Having been provided with a general framework for the
consideration of CSR issues, MNEs are likely to increasingly engage in such integra-
41. Porter & Kramer, supra note 8, at 89.
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tion. Nonetheless, the Guidelines, beyond merely encouraging MNEs to match best
practices, do not set out a specific requirement or framework for this to take place.
F. Creating a Social Dimension to the Value Proposition
Finally, Porter and Kramer argue that "[t] he most strategic CSR occurs when
a company adds a social dimension to its value proposition, making social impact
integral to the overall strategy."42 General Electric's Ecomagination provides an
illustrative example.43 It is important to note that for some brands, such as Whole
Foods Market, social issues are fundamental to their value proposition. This is
unlikely to be the case for a financial institution, particularly with regard to the
implementation of environmental initiatives. Nonetheless, some international
banks appear to create a social dimension to their value proposition.
For example, Deutsche Bank's Microcredit Development Fund (DB MDF),
launched in 1998, is a financial tool fuelling microfinance programs around the
world. "Since its inception, the DB MDF has invested over a total of $3.4 million
in loans to some 35 microfinance institutions in 21 countries, enabling more than
$42 million to be leveraged in private financing lending capacity to the very
poor."' 4  In this way, there are opportunities for financial institutions to integrate
social concerns with value, regardless of whether the EPs are the most appropriate
vehicles for doing so.
In another recent, exciting, and potentially international development involv-
ing green buildings, a partnership of leaders in the capital markets is attempting
to stimulate the global economy, stop irreversible and dangerous climate change,
and promote global sustainability by introducing "sustainable mortgage backed
securities" (MBS) into the international mortgaged backed securities market. The
partnership consists of investment banks, investors, national governments, and
non-governmental organizations. It has completed the due diligence needed to
launch sustainable MBSs within existing bank operations in the $4 trillion global
MBS market. Sustainable MBSs are essentially bonds backed by a pool of green
building mortgages. Investment banks have submitted sustainable MBSs to rating
agencies. If sustainable MBSs penetrate the global market for mortgage securiti-
42. Id. at 89-90.
43. GE Ecomagination: Our Commitment, http://www.ge.ecomagination.com/site/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 6,2008).
44. Deutsche Bank, Corporate Social Responsibility: Microfinance, http://www.communityuk
.db.com/microfinance.php (last visited Oct. 6,2008).
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zations, the benefits may stimulate the global economy, improve energy security,
and help prevent climate change by encouraging green credentials for properties.
The success of this initiative is likely to hinge on a recovery from the ongoing
global "credit crunch" that has blighted the asset-backed securities market.
As with the EPs, the Guidelines are relatively unsuccessful in encouraging
MNEs to create a social dimension to the value proposition beyond encouraging
them to take CSR-related issues seriously. This is perhaps the central failure of the
generic guidance offered by non-specific voluntary initiatives. Initiatives that re-
quire companies to consider in greater detail the interrelationships between them-
selves and society, and subject such relationships to review, are more likely to
generate the kinds of competitive advantages that Porter and Kramer argue ought
to result from high-quality CSR.
III. How THE LACK OF FORMAL LEGAL SANCTION IS ADDRESSED
The above Part illustrates that, judged against Porter and Kramer's criteria for
the implementation of successful (competitive) CSR that moves beyond the purely
philanthropic, the EPs and the Guidelines have had some success, but there remains
substantial room for improvement. One factor that Porter and Kramer do not ad-
dress is the criticism that the voluntary nature of such initiatives makes them inher-
ently flawed. This Part aims to show that there are processes and procedures that
can be put into place to address the lack of formal redress or sanction'
A. Reasons for Adoption
Many different reasons have been advanced by EPFIs for adopting the EPs
and MNEs for acting in accordance with the Guidelines. These include the pro-
tection of reputation, defense against civil society activism, and matching sector
best practices.46 Such organizations are likely to be cautious about reneging on the
commitments to which they have agreed and thereby sacrificing the many bene-
fits that lead them to adopt the EPs. When organizations sign on to voluntary
initiatives, they are generally unlikely to actively seek to expose themselves to crit-
icism by acting in a way that is wholly inconsistent with such initiatives.
45. Formal sanctions could take the form of civil penalties such as the imposition of fines, the
binding decision of regulators to bar particular behavior, or putting a particular procedure into
place. They need not require the imposition of criminal sanctions.
46. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER,Supra note 14, at 71.
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B. High-Level Commitment
With respect to the EPs, many leading figures in the banking community
have demonstrated a commitment to social and environmental responsibility.47
Project finance is particularly sensitive to such considerations. It is clear that the
pressure to live up to this commitment is driven from the leadership, and that
many bankers will be concerned that financing a project without properly com-
plying with the EPs risks the wrath of senior management. The same is likely to
be true with respect to MNEs that implement the principles set out in the Guide-
lines. As the Guidelines are adopted by governments, this "high-level commit-
ment" should also be imposed on MNEs by governments keen to ensure that
MNEs for which they are "responsible" act in accordance with Guidelines.
C. Reputation
EPFIs have sought reputational protection by adopting the EPs.48 The EPs allow
EPFIs to hold themselves out as responsible lenders by complying with widely ad-
opted "best practice" standards. This reputational advantage is supported by the fact
that the EPs are underpinned by the IFC's Safeguard Policies. Banks and financial
institutions continue to suffer damage to their reputations from lending practices
perceived as irresponsible. Adoption of the EPs helps to guard against this damage.
These factors also apply to MNEs with respect to the Guidelines. The ten-
dency of civil society to monitor and report on MNEs' performance, especially
against the obligations set out by the EPs and the Guidelines, can only mean that
EPFIs and MNEs are under increasing reputational pressure to comply with
them.4 9 EPFIs and MNEs in general are also likely to be concerned with how
they are perceived by industry regulators and fund and asset managers who mon-
itor social and environmental impacts.
D. Compliance Adviser/Ombudsman
There are currently no formal provisions in the EPs to sanction entities that
engage in "greenwash" by adopting the EPs but failing to properly implement
them. It has been argued that it would be useful to provide a compliance adviser
47. Id. at 56.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 7.
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and ombudsman to advise third parties on issues relating to a project and to mon-
itor and regulate the implementation of EPs. On the other hand, the Guidelines
set out a clear process for parties to make complaints.
As critics of the Guidelines are quick to point out, such a mechanism is not in
itself foolproof. For example, in the opinion of OECD Watch, five years after the
latest reform of the Guidelines,
OECD Watch has determined there is no evidence that the Guide-
lines have helped to reduce the number of conflicts between local
communities, civil society groups and foreign investors. As a global
mechanism to improve the operations of multinational enterprises
and contribute to a reduction in conflicts on social, environmental
and human rights issues, experience with the Guidelines over the
past five years demonstrates they are simply inadequate and defi-
cient. Moreover, without the threat of effective sanctions, there is
little incentive for companies to ensure that their operations are in
compliance with the Guidelines.5"
E. Protection of Market Share and Differentiation
As the number of EPFIs increases, it becomes more difficult for EPFIs to dif-
ferentiate themselves by adopting the EPs. Nevertheless, it remains likely that the
increased due diligence required by the EPs means that projects will be shielded
from at least some adverse criticism by stakeholders."i EPFIs are therefore likely to
want to properly implement the EPs in order to more successfully manage projects by
reducing costly delays caused by poor social planning and ill-considered environ-
mental consequences. Although this consideration applies less to MNEs with respect
to the Guidelines, they are still likely to comply due to moral considerations. Reputa-
ble global players are likely to wish to avoid being seen as one of a diminishing group
of entities that do not apply widely adopted social and environmental standards.
50. OECD WATCH, supra note 24, at 45.
51. Id. at 59.
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F Syndication
Finally, with respect to the EPs, project sponsors are likely to encourage banks to
adopt the EPs if it becomes the case that compliance leads to more successful project
syndication. Syndication difficulties can increase costs, have a negative effect on repu-
tation, and make it harder to attract finance for future projects. The length of time
and cost of syndication might also increase if arrangers invoke provisions in their
mandate letters that allow them to withdraw from arranging financing if there is
insufficient take-up from the market as a result of the project not being compliant.
G. Moves Toward Formal Sanction
The factors outlined above can be seen as purely informal mechanisms of
sanction for breach of the requirements of the EPs and the Guidelines. The
Guidelines contain provisions that have the hallmarks of more formal sanctions,
and EP2 has introduced three additional methods of sanction, which it was hoped
would encourage compliance with the EPs and increase accountability. These in-
clude obligations to put in place independent review, grievance procedures, and
annual reporting obligations.
1. Mediation, Conciliation, and Grievance Procedures
Under the Guidelines, NCPs are required to contribute to the resolution of issues
that arise relating to implementation of the Guidelines. 2 They offer a forum for dis-
cussion and assist the business community, employee organizations, and other con-
cerned parties in dealing with the issues in an efficient and timely manner and in
accordance with applicable law. 3 The role of NCPs includes offering and facilitating
access to consensual and non-adversarial means, such as conciliation or mediation. 4
Parallels can be drawn between this and the consultation and grievance mecha-
nisms set out in the EPs. EP2 requires a grievance procedure to be put in place dur-
ing a project's lifetime for the benefit of project-affected communities." It nevertheless
falls far short of fully addressing the lack of accountability in implementing the EPs.
In light of several recent, well-publicized projects, there has been a call for sponsors
52. OECD Guidelines, supra note 7, at 36-37.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 36.
55. Equator Principles, supra note 6, princ. 6.
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and for EPFIs to become more transparent and accountable to both the communi-
ties affected directly by such projects and to civil society generally.5 6
2. Loan Document Covenants
The lack of formal legal sanction of the EPs has been partly addressed in
EP2 by the introduction of loan covenants. 7 They are intended to trigger a de-
fault under the financing arrangements when there is non-compliance with the
EPs, potentially allowing the EPFIs to accelerate repayments of any loans. How-
ever, the introduction of these covenants actually represented a codification of ex-
isting practice. For example, most loan documents already had a covenant
requiring the borrower to comply with local laws.
3. Independent Review
For all Category A projects and, where appropriate, Category B projects,
EPFIs can require independent review by a social or environmental expert not
directly associated with the borrower. The scope of the review that the indepen-
dent expert may be requested to carry out includes the environmental and social
impact assessment, action plan, and consultation process documentation." The
purpose of the review is to assist an EPFI in its due diligence of the development
and operation of the project and its compliance with the EPs.
4. Annual Reporting Obligations
EP2 requires EPFIs to provide public reports at least annually.5 9 The report
must cover implementation of the EPs processes and the experience of the EPFI,
subject to the requirements of client confidentiality. At a minimum, the report
should address the number of transactions screened by the EPFI and the catego-
rization of each transaction, as well as information on the implementation of the
EPs. In addition, the EPFI report may include a breakdown of transactions and
categorizations by sector or region.
5. Toward Accountability?
When taken together, the introduction of grievance procedures, independent
56. BANKTRACK, PRINCIPLES, PROFITS OR JUST PR? TRIPLE P INVESTMENTS UNDER THE PRINCI-
PLES (2004), http://www.foe.org/res/pubs/pdf/princprofspr.pdf.
57. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
58. Equator Principles, supra note 6, princ. 7.
59. Id. princ. 10.
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expert appraisal, and community consultation have created a more powerful arsenal
of tools with which EPFIs and civil society can more effectively monitor compliance
with the EPs. This reinforces the significance of the less coercive, but equally im-
portant, sanctions of loss of reputation and falling below internal and market expec-
tations. It remains to be seen whether future developments in the EPs will lead to
the introduction of more formal methods of holding EPFIs to account.
With respect to the EPs, the fact that there are no formal legal sanctions for
their breach does not mean that they are fundamentally flawed from a CSR per-
spective. In fact, their lack of legal sanction is likely to have contributed substan-
tially to the enthusiastic adoption of the EPs. However, it fails to establish the
value of the EPs above and beyond the reasons for their adoption outlined in the
previous sections of this article. Further, the Guidelines have, since 2000, bene-
fited from a more detailed procedure for enforceability than the EPs. On the other
hand, these procedures are not regarded by all stakeholders as adequate or even
effective.
IV. IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS OF VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES
In light of the somewhat disappointing, if not inevitable, conclusion that the
EPs and the Guidelines could go further than they currently do in implementing
a CSR agenda that reaps maximum competitive advantage for EPFIs and MNEs,
what is the future for such voluntary initiatives?
A. Tightening Up Existing Voluntary Initiatives
One approach would be to insist on the increased tightening and proliferation
of existing voluntary initiatives. For example, the EPs could be extended to a
broader range of financing and could apply its more onerous criteria to all, not
merely Category A, projects. The Guidelines could specify the kind of EMS to be
put in place, and the requirement for EMS could be extended to include social
impacts. On its own, however, a mere tightening of voluntary initiatives is not
likely to lead to the cultural shift that Porter and Kramer believe is necessary.
B. Increase in Number or Consolidation of Initiatives
An alternative approach would be to encourage adoption and implementa-
tion of further voluntary CSR initiatives. While this may at first appear attractive,
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if further CSR initiatives are introduced (as seems inevitable), it would be wise for
them to encourage businesses to confront the strategic issues raised by Porter and
Kramer when designing them. However, there is a significant risk that MNEs,
the public and civil society will become overwhelmed by a seemingly endless array
of voluntary initiatives. This could lead to CSR being perceived as a smokescreen
rather than a force for good.
C. Ombudsman and Grievance Mechanisms
The lack of accountability with respect to voluntary initiatives is met with
significant criticism. It creates distrust about whether such initiatives are being
actively enforced and properly implemented and leads to accusations of "green-
wash." This problem can be tackled through a number of changes. Each volun-
tary initiative should ideally provide for an ombudsman to whom concerns can be
referred by any party for review. The ombudsman should also be responsible for
handling implementation questions from entities implementing the initiative.
However, this is not a panacea. NCPs effectively act as an ombudsman, but this
has not eliminated all critiques of the Guidelines.
D. Reporting
Reporting on the incidence of compliance (and non-compliance) with volun-
tary initiatives is likely to improve the implementation of initiatives by MNEs and
also the public trust in the quality of implementation. Disclosure should be made
available on MNEs' websites and should conform to pre-determined criteria set
by the ombudsman. An ombudsman should report on implementation at least
annually and set out recommendations for change. Organizations that fail to meet
disclosure criteria should be "de-listed" and, as a consequence, subject to public
sanction.
E. Cross-over of Voluntary and Mandatory Regimes
In many instances, formal regulators, such as states and local authorities, are
already turning to standards that have been voluntarily adopted and implemented
by MNEs. One example of this is the requirement that buildings conform to volun-
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tary "green buildings" standards, such as BREEAM ° and LEED.6" Another ex-
ample is the U.K.'s Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO),62 which relies
on a number of voluntarily adopted standards relating to the social and environ-
mental performance of biofuel feedstocks.63 The cross-over of such voluntary and
mandatory regimes is likely to enhance the penetration of CSR and also to improve
the quality and consistency of their implementation. For example, under the RTFO,
in the future, biofuels that do not meet qualifying voluntary standards may not re-
ceive public subsidy by generating valuable renewable certificates.64
F. Certification
Many voluntary initiatives rely on a process of certification. A certificate is
produced to show that an entity has complied with the initiative's requirements.
Certification requires administration and thus adds cost and complexity to volun-
tary regimes. However, it does provide a useful means of verifying compliance
with recognized standards. Certification can be integrated into the functions of
an ombudsman, though this may lead to accusations of conflicts of interest. This
could also pave the way for trading of such certificates.
G. Securing International Mandates
The vast array of voluntary initiatives already available to MNEs is further
complicated by the adoption of different voluntary standards in different countries
of regions concerning similar issues. Conflicts between voluntary standards, such as
U.K. and U.S. versions of green building codes, cause uncertainties and implemen-
tation difficulties. This also highlights the importance of securing international
mandates for voluntary initiatives. Although it may not be possible to generate a
"one size fits all" solution for all jurisdictions, where possible this should be done.
60. Building Research Environmental Assessment Method, http://www.breeam.org/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 6,2008).
61. U.S. Green Building Council, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
Rating Systems, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=222 (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
62. This is effectively a biofuels subsidy.
63. Roundtable on Sustainable Oil, http://www.rspo.org/Key-documents.aspx (last visited Oct.
6,2008).
64. See Consultation on the Draft Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations (Amendment) Order
2009, http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/rftoorder/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
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H. Changes in Perception
The steps outlined above are likely to improve both the perception and the
quality of voluntary initiatives. They do not, on their own, address Porter and
Kramer's vision of the implementation of a more strategic kind of CSR. If existing
and future voluntary initiatives are to lead to the kind of CSR cultural shift that
Porter and Kramer believe is required, a paradigm shift must first occur in the
perception of both those who are designing and implementing such initiatives
and public expectations regarding such initiatives' goals.
Though MNEs are very aware that CSR can generate competitive advan-
tages, they appear to be ashamed to admit openly that CSR will be most effective
when it works in harmony with sound business strategy, and therefore, fail to in-
tegrate CSR with their everyday business activities. MNEs' nervousness is perhaps
not surprising given the array of non-governmental organizations monitoring
their CSR performance. However, openness in relation to this issue by MNEs is
likely to lead to better CSR, which will have more lasting positive effects. Such a
shift in perception must also be matched by a change in the general public's expec-
tations of how CSR initiatives can best be implemented.
L Taking a More Strategic Approach
Following Porter and Kramer's reasoning, MNEs must begin to implement
the competitive advantages that CSR can unlock by integrating their CSR initia-
tives with the core activities of their business. This process of unlocking value will
doubtless be improved if existing and future voluntary initiatives are designed in
a way that forces MNEs to consider the inside-out and outside-in social linkages
that exist and to construct a social agenda for the company based around such
linkages.
Companies should therefore be more strategic in choosing which voluntary
initiatives to adopt. They should also redesign existing initiatives in a way that
will encourage participants to take a more strategic approach. This could be done,
for example, by encouraging reporting and disclosure of the competitive synergies
to which such initiatives are leading. Companies could be encouraged to report on
the social and economic benefits that have accrued not just to the beneficiaries of
CSR but also to the MNE itself.
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CONCLUSION
The rise of voluntary CSR initiatives has been meteoric. As the CSR market
matures, it would be advisable for MNEs to assess the extent to which voluntary
initiatives are being promulgated in ways that best serve the needs of the business
community and society at large. Piecemeal attempts to improve performance in
particular sectors, while leading to positive improvements, are unlikely to fully
serve those needs, nor are very general, broad-brush initiatives that set out a loose
framework for the consideration of CSR values by MNEs.
In relation to both the EPs and the Guidelines, formal enforcement mecha-
nisms would benefit both legal instruments and the accountability of EPFIs and
MNEs that have adopted the Guidelines, and would enhance the robustness of the
rules provided. On the other hand, formal legal redress substantially may discour-
age adoption of the EPs and the Guidelines. It may therefore be desirable to first put
in place a number of less formal penalties before formal sanctions are imposed.
A fundamentally different approach to CSR that accrues benefits not just to
its stakeholders but to the company itself should be implemented. If properly
done, this would have the effect of encouraging MNEs to engage in more exten-
sive CSR activities to improve shareholder value and create net gains for the exter-
nal beneficiaries of CSR.
Few people have suggested models for the implementation of a more com-
petitive approach to CSR, though companies like Marriott and General Electric
have begun to live by its tenets. One model for taking a more organized approach
that analyzes and exploits horizontal and vertical linkages of environmental and
social benefit with business' existing expertise is the one set out by Porter and
Kramer. Though the deteriorating global economic outlook of the late 2000s may
put wholesale reform of CSR on the backburner, perhaps this will be the CSR
success of the coming decade.
